Previous studies argue that, based on the New Keynesian framework, a …scal stimulus …-nanced by money creation has a strong positive e¤ect on output under a reasonable degree of nominal price rigidities. This paper investigates the e¤ects of implementation lag in the money…nanced …scal stimulus on output. We show that if a money-…nanced government purchase has a time lag between the decision and the implementation: (1) it may cause a recession rather than a boom when the economy is in normal times; (2) it may deepen a recession when the economy is in a liquidity trap; (3) the longer is the implementation lag, the deeper is the recession; and (4) the depth of the recession depends on the interest semi-elasticity of money demand.
Introduction
Government spending to stimulate the economy is typically …nanced through government debt and eventually taxes. The global …nancial crisis in the last decade led to high levels of the government debt-to-GDP ratio in many countries and these countries' policy interest rates hit the zero lower bound (ZLB). Against this backdrop, some argue that a …scal stimulus …nanced by money creation can be considered a policy option to boost aggregate demand (Galí 2017 , English, Erceg and López-Salido 2017, among others). 1 This policy option relies neither on lowering the nominal interest rate nor on further issuance of government debt, because the …scal stimulus is …nanced by seigniorage. Using the standard New Keynesian model with a reasonable degree of nominal rigidities, Galí (2017) shows that an unexpected shock to money-…nanced government purchases or tax cuts can have a large positive impact on output along with a crowding-in e¤ect on consumption. English, Erceg and López-Salido (2017) also argue that a money-…nanced …scal stimulus is a powerful tool for boosting aggregate demand if such …scal policy is credible. Overall, these studies …nd that the money-…nanced …scal stimulus can increase output and in ‡ation as well as reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio substantially. 2 This paper investigates the role of an implementation lag in the e¤ect of money-…nanced government purchases. The introduction of an implementation lag of …scal policy into the standard New Keynesian model is a straightforward extension of the model. However, it captures an important aspect of …scal policy and thus has been widely discussed in the literature. Ramey (2011) provides empirical evidence that government purchases tend to involve long lags between the decision to spend and the actual increase in spending. Cwik and Wieland (2011) 1 For more practical discussions on the e¢ cacy of money-…nanced …scal stimulus, see Turner (2015) . 2 Di Giorgio and Tra…cante (2018) …nd qualitatively similar results in a two-country model. 3 For the theoretical formalization of the unconventional …scal policy, see Correia, Farhi, Nicolini and Teles (2013).
We present four …ndings, in all of which the implementation lag plays an important role for the e¢ cacy of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus. The …rst …nding is that, if the money-…nanced …scal stimulus involves an implementation lag, the …scal stimulus may cause a recession rather than a boom. This is in sharp contrast to a money-…nanced …scal stimulus without an implementation lag, in which the …scal stimulus boosts aggregate demand strongly as discussed in the literature.
The mechanism behind our …rst …nding can be understood from an in ‡uential study by Ball (1994) , who …nds that a credible disin ‡ationary announcement in the presence of nominal rigidities causes a boom rather than a recession. In his analysis, if a decline in the money growth rate is anticipated, forward-looking …rms reduce prices prior to the actual decline in the money growth rate. Ball (1994) assumes that households'consumption is constrained by their real money balances (i.e., the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint). In this case, the lower aggregate prices result in higher real money balances and relax the CIA constraint. The resulting higher aggregate demand leads to a boom prior to the decline in the money growth rate. Ball's (1994) argument is applicable to our context, but in an opposite direction. In our analysis, if the money-…nanced …scal stimulus is anticipated in advance because of an implementation lag, forward-looking …rms increase prices prior to the actual increase in money supply that …nances the …scal stimulus. The higher aggregate prices result in lower real money balances and tighten the CIA constraint. The resulting lower aggregate demand leads to a recession prior to the implementation of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus.
The second …nding of this paper is that such a negative e¤ect on output remains even when the economy is caught in a liquidity trap. If the money-…nanced …scal stimulus is implemented without a lag, the economy experiences a faster recovery from a recession caused by the liquidity trap than the case of no policy change. However, an implementation lag in the money-…nanced …scal stimulus may result in a slower recovery from the recession than the case of no policy change.
The mechanism behind our second …nding is slightly di¤erent from that behind the …rst …nding.
Because the nominal interest rate is zero in the liquidity trap, there is no opportunity cost of holding money. In this case, it is not necessarily optimal for the household to reduce money holding to the level required for its consumption and thus the CIA constraint does not bind. Once the CIA constraint does not bind, current consumption is in ‡uenced by the dynamic path of the real interest rate through the Euler equation.
When the money-…nanced …scal stimulus is announced, households and …rms know that the future government spending will raise the real interest rate at the time of implementation. A high real interest rate in the future crowds out current consumption through the Euler equation.
As long as the real interest rate increases su¢ ciently, current consumption is crowded out by the money-…nanced …scal stimulus with an implementation lag. By contrast, the money-…nanced …scal stimulus without an implementation lag immediately generates higher in ‡ation because of the actual increases in the money supply and government purchases. Higher in ‡ation under the liquidity trap leads to higher aggregate demand so that consumption is higher than in the case of no policy change.
Turning to the third …nding, we show that the negative e¤ect becomes stronger as the implementation lag of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus lengthens. The intuition is simple, especially in the case of the binding CIA constraint. If the implementation lag lengthens, the …rms have more opportunity to increase prices before the implementation. As a result, the aggregate price level increases and the CIA constraint becomes tighter, reducing consumption. Therefore, the recession is deeper, as the implementation lag is longer.
Finally, our analysis also suggests the importance of the interest semi-elasticity of money demand for the e¢ cacy of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus with an implementation lag. If money demand is inelastic with respect to the nominal interest rate, the money market equilibrium condition suggests that a reduction in real money balances resulting from higher prices needs to be absorbed by a large increase in the nominal interest rate. Therefore, if the increase in the nominal interest rate transmits to the real interest rate, it weakens aggregate demand. By contrast, if money demand is elastic with respect to the nominal interest rate, the reduced real money balances can be absorbed by a small increase in the nominal interest rate. As a result, even when the money…nanced …scal stimulus is implemented with a lag, higher in ‡ation can keep the real interest rate low, supporting aggregate consumption. Therefore, the money-…nanced …scal stimulus under a high interest semi-elasticity of money demand may have a strong positive e¤ect on output, even with an implementation lag.
We provide some policy implications for the money-…nanced …scal stimulus by combining our …ndings with the instability of money demand. The previous studies on money demand suggest that the interest semi-elasticity of money demand often varies across the sample period. 4 According to our model, the instability of money demand implies that the e¤ect on output can also be unstable in the money-…nanced …scal stimulus because output responses to the announcement of the …scal stimulus are very sensitive to the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. In the standard debt-…nanced …scal stimulus, by contrast, output responses are not sensitive to the instability of money demand. Using numerical analyses, we also show that the implementation lag increases the instability of output responses in the money-…nanced …scal stimulus. For example, even a single-quarter implementation lag increases variations of output responses by approximately 47 percent.
We thus conclude that the policymaker should possess detailed knowledge on the money demand function to carry out a successful money-…nanced …scal stimulus. The immediate implementation of the …scal stimulus would obviously improve its e¢ cacy. However, if the implementation lag is di¢ cult to shorten, a money-…nanced …scal stimulus may be a policy option that requires a stable and interest-elastic money demand.
The model
The model we consider is a stylized New Keynesian model with a ZLB constraint on the nominal interest rate. Our model is similar to Galí (2017) . He compares the equilibrium dynamics without an implementation lag between money-and debt-…nanced …scal stimuli. By contrast, we mainly focus on an implementation lag in a money-…nanced …scal stimulus and compare the e¤ects of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus with and without the implementation lag. Following Galí (2017), we assume a deterministic environment other than Calvo pricing. In addition to the presence of the implementation lag, our model also di¤ers from Galí (2017) in that we employ the CIA constraint for modeling money demand. This simplifying assumption is particularly helpful in understanding why the money-…nanced …scal stimulus may cause a recession.
Household and …rms
A representative household maximizes its lifetime utility given by P 1 t=0 t U (C t ; N t ) ;where
Here, C t , N t , and Z t represent consumption, labor supply, and an exogenous preference shifter, respectively. The parameters > 0, ' > 0, and 0 < < 1 denote the degree of relative risk aversion, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and the discount factor, respectively. Throughout the model, the unit of time t is one quarter. The household faces a budget constraint and a CIA constraint as follows:
where M t is nominal money holdings, B t denotes household's nominal holdings of one-period government bonds that pay the nominal interest rate I t , P t represents the aggregate price index, and W t is nominal wages. Furthermore, D t denotes …rms'real pro…ts and T t is lump-sum taxes in real terms. The left-hand side of (1) is the nominal value of total wealth that the household brings into period t. The right-hand side indicates that the household receives the nominal income W t N t +P t D t and pays taxes P t T t . It also carries the nominal bonds and cash remaining after consumption into period t. As usual, a no Ponzi game condition holds. Equation (2) is the CIA constraint.
The …rst-order conditions are standard: 5
where U C;t = C t Z t and U N;t = N ' t Z t . When I t > 0, (5) holds with equality. This is because holding money beyond the nominal transaction P t C t is not optimal under the strictly positive opportunity cost of money holding. When I t = 0, however, M t is a perfect substitute for B t in transferring the wealth into the next period and the CIA constraint is not necessarily binding.
That is, the CIA constraint may not be binding if the nominal interest rate hits the ZLB (and vice versa).
The representative …rm produces the …nal good in a perfectly competitive market. It combines a continuum of intermediate goods, using the technology
, where 
subject to the demand function Y t+kjt = (P t =P t+k ) Y t+k ; where Y t+kjt denotes an intermediate good's output in period t + k for the producer that last reset its price in period t and Q t; t+k U C;t+k =U C;t is the discount factor of the …rm. The …rst-order condition for P t is
Along with the price index, log-linearizing this equation around the zero steady-state in ‡ation rate leads to the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Government
Our experiment examines the impact of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus with an implementation lag of h periods. Following Galí (2017), let g t be government purchases, which exceed its steady-state level, expressed as a fraction of the steady-state output (i.e., g t (G t G)=Y where G t is government purchases and G and Y are the steady-state value of government purchases and output, respectively). At t = 0, the government announces the following …scal stimulus:
where h 0. Here 2 [0; 1) measures the persistence of an exogenous increase in g t because g t+1 = g t for t h. For any h 0, the magnitude of the initial increase in the government purchases is normalized to one percent of the steady-state output, because g t is de…ned as g t = (G t G) =Y .
Our experiment on the implementation lag allows for h > 0. The household and …rms will take some actions between 0 t < h before G t actually increases. Obviously, when h = 0, the …scal stimulus is implemented without a lag.
To analyze the money-…nanced …scal stimulus, we follow the literature and consider the government as a single consolidated entity consisting of the …scal authority and the central bank. Let M s t be the money supply. The government's consolidated budget constraint is
where
The left-hand side of (8) means that the government purchases the …nal goods G t and repays one-period government bonds with interest rate, (1 + I t 1 ) B t 1 . On the right-hand side of (8) , the government collects the lump-sum taxes and issues new government bonds and non-interest-bearing money to …nance its expenditure. Let us divide both sides of (8) by P t to obtain the consolidated budget constraint in real terms:
where R t = (1 + I t ) P t =P t+1 , and B t = B t =P t . In the equation, M s t =P t is real seigniorage revenue. We assume that G t , T t , and B t have their steady state values and seigniorage is zero in the steady state ( M s t = 0). These assumptions imply that G + RB = T + B in the steady state, where a variable without a subscript indicates the steady-state value. Let t and b t be the lump-sum taxes and the issuance of real government bonds exceeding its own steady-state level expressed as a fraction of the steady-state output, respectively (i.e., t = (T t T ) =Y , and b t = (B t B) =Y .).
We take the di¤erence between G + RB = T + B and (9) and express the resulting equation as a fraction of the steady-state output. As a result, the linearly approximated consolidated budget constraint is
where b = B=Y , i t = ln [(1 + I t ) =R], t = ln (P t =P t 1 ), and m s t = ln M s t =M s t 1 . Furthermore, V is the steady-state value of the income velocity of money (given by V t = P t Y t =M s t ). The …rst and second terms of the right-hand side of (10) 
The last term is the linear approximation of the real seigniorage revenue around M s = 0 and = 0. More speci…cally, real seigniorage expressed as a fraction of the steady-state output is M s t = (P t Y ) and can be approximated as
We now de…ne the money-…nanced …scal stimulus as the monetization of government purchases satisfying:
That is, all government purchases exceeding its steady-state level is …nanced by the seigniorage. 7 By dividing both sides by the steady-state output, we have g t ' m s t =V from (11) . Therefore, the money supply under the money-…nanced …scal stimulus is approximately determined by
The lump-sum tax in (10) is speci…ed by the following reaction function:
Substituting (12) and (13) into (10), we have
where we assume that R b < 1 to ensure the stability of b t . 8 The dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio here are residually determined from the system of equations under (12) and (13) . In this model, b t is driven by the interest payment on the government debt and its persistence depends on how we specify b in (13).
Market clearing
Equilibrium in the …nal goods market requires Y t = C t +G t . The labor market clearing condition
For the money market, we assume that the money supply fully 7 Galí (2017) considers a money-…nanced …scal stimulus that keeps the issuance of government bonds unchanged in real terms. The money-…nanced …scal stimulus considered here involves money creation that …nances the government purchases in excess of its steady-state level. This is because Galí's (2017) speci…cation often violates the BlanchardKahn condition, if it is combined with the CIA constraint. By contrast, ours robustly satis…es the Blanchard-Kahn condition regardless of our assumption about the money demand function. 8 Here we assume that the …scal policy is passive in the sense of Leeper (1991) . When we assume the active …scal policy along with (12) , the system of equations is explosive.
determines the household's nominal holdings of money so that M s t = M t for all t. This assumption is not inconsistent with the CIA constraint as an inequality constraint. If I t > 0 in equilibrium, the CIA constraint is binding and the household's desired level of money equals the money supply:
t . If I t = 0, the CIA constraint is not binding and not all of the money will be used to purchase goods: M t > P t C t . The remaining cash can still be used for transferring the household's wealth into the next period. Therefore, M s t = M t holds for all t. Likewise, the government bond market also clears as usual if I t 0. If I t = 0, the nominal bond holdings by the household are fully determined by the money supply in the economy.
Results
To assess the impact of the implementation lag of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus on equilibrium dynamics, we use the (log) linearized version of the model around the zero in ‡ation steady state. 9 We perform two experiments, based on two initial states of the economy: (i) normal times with I t > 0 and (ii) the liquidity trap with I t = 0. We conduct the …rst experiment particularly because it helps us better understand equilibrium dynamics in a liquidity trap. We then assess the e¤ects of the length of the implementation lag and the interest semi-elasticity of money demand.
Calibration
For the simulations, we select = 0:995, = 1, ' = 5, = 1=4, = 9, = 3=4, b = 0:02, and b = 2:4. These parameters are taken from Galí (2017) and all standard in the literature.
Because in ‡ation is zero in the steady state, = 0:995 implies that the annualized real interest rate is two percent in the steady state (i.e., R = 1:005). The steady-state share of government purchases to output is 20 percent (i.e., = G=Y = 0:2), which is consistent with the U.S. data. 10 By de…nition, the income velocity
Assuming that the CIA constraint in the steady state holds with equality, the steady-state income velocity is given by V = Y =C = 1= (1 ) = 1:25. In terms of implementation lag h, there seems no strong consensus about how long it takes for the government to implement their policy in general or how far in advance agents become aware of possible changes in the money-…nanced …scal stimulus. For example, using the narrative-approach tax shock series of Romer and Romer (2010), Mertens and Ravn (2011) …nd that the median implementation lag is six quarters for a tax shock. Ramey (2011) 9 The linearized equations are described in the Appendix A of this paper. 1 0 For example, see Erceg and Lindé (2014) .
argues that defense spending shocks identi…ed by vector autoregressions using the postwar U.S. data are forecastable four quarters in advance. She also argues that even nondefense spending would be known at least a few months in advance. Therefore, we consider a relatively wide range of values of h in the simulations. Taking these previous studies into account, we set h = 6 as the benchmark and consider h = 1, 4, and 8 for robustness. 11 3.2 The e¤ect of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus on output
Experiment I: The economy in normal times
The …rst experiment considers the money-…nanced …scal stimulus in normal times. More specifically, we assume that the economy for t < 0 is initially in the steady state with I t > 0. Given this state of the economy, the money-…nanced …scal stimulus is announced at t = 0 and implemented at t = h 0. Figure 1 plots the output response to the money-…nanced …scal stimulus with and without an implementation lag (denoted by "h = 6" and "h = 0" in the …gure). The blue line indicates the output response when the money-…nanced …scal stimulus is implemented immediately. In this case, the money-…nanced …scal stimulus can also be understood as an unanticipated …scal stimulus implemented at t = 0. In response to this unanticipated …scal stimulus, output exhibits a substantial expansion. In fact, when government purchases increase by one percent of the steadystate output, output in the same period increases by 1.40 percent, meaning that the government spending multiplier is larger than unity. The positive response is large because of expansionary …scal policy and simultaneous monetary expansion.
The red line in Figure 1 indicates that, if the same …scal stimulus is implemented with a lag, the output responses di¤er dramatically from the previous case. In this case, the money-…nanced …scal stimulus is announced at t = 0 and the implementation at t = 6 is credibly anticipated.
In response to the announcement, output gradually decreases. That is, the money-…nanced …scal stimulus causes a recession rather than a boom. The output decline is substantial at 0:77 percent immediately before the implementation. Once the …scal stimulus is implemented at t = 6, output responses become positive for t h. However, when g t increases, output in the same period increases by only 0.87 percent (compared with the steady-state value), implying the …scal stimulus has a weaker e¤ect. 1 1 The not-for-publication appendix provides many robustness checks for , ', , and , as well as the size of the initial output decline caused by the liquidity trap. Our results in this paper are robust to changes in these parameters.
The reason for the recession is straightforward. Aggregate demand is depressed by the increases in prices before the implementation of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus. To better understand this, let us express the money and goods market equilibrium conditions in log-linearized form. The money market equilibrium condition is c t = m s t p t and the goods market equilibrium condition is y t = (1 ) c t + g t , where m s t and p t represent the log-deviation from their (initial) values at t = 1. Also, c t and y t are the log-deviation from the steady state. Combining these two equations yields
By de…nition, m s 1 and p 1 are zero. Therefore, m s t and g t are also zero before the money-…nanced …scal stimulus is implemented (i.e., m s t = g t = 0 for t < h). However, p t can change during the period between announcement and implementation (i.e., 0 t < h). In response to the announcement, forward-looking …rms increase prices prior to the implementation. That is, higher aggregate demand in the future increases prices p t . Therefore, we have
for 0 t < h. This implies that the money-…nanced …scal stimulus for h > 0 causes a recession rather than a boom.
The mechanism behind the output reduction is the same as that discovered by Ball (1994) in the context of the credible announcement of disin ‡ationary policy. Ball (1994) shows that the credible announcement of disin ‡ationary monetary policy (i.e., an announcement of a decline in money growth) causes a boom rather than a recession in a sticky price model. In our model with …scal policy, the announcement of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus is equivalent to an announcement of in ‡ationary policy, causing a recession rather than a boom. In the second row, consumption exhibits dynamic patterns similar to output, although the increase in consumption at the time of implementation is smaller than that in output. The nominal and real interest rates are volatile, peaking in period 5. Furthermore, the nominal interest rate is completely insensitive before the implementation, based on our calibrated degree of relative risk aversion of unity. 12 This insensitive response of the nominal interest rate for t < h is preserved even in the economy caught in a liquidity trap and thus the duration of ZLB spells is not substantially shortened by this …scal stimulus. The debt-to-GDP ratio temporarily decreases but increases afterward because the real interest rate becomes high at the time of the implementation of the …scal stimulus.
Before going to the next experiment, two remarks are in order. First, as suggested from (16), a recession before the implementation is robust at least qualitatively as long as price setting by …rms is forward-looking. A recent study by Gabaix (2018) introduces myopic economic agents who discount future economic conditions more strongly than the standard rational expectations model.
Even in this case, the forward-looking price setting ensures a recession, though the size of the recession is small. 13 Second, more importantly, our explanation for a recession before the implementation of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus did not rely on the Euler equation. In this particular case with the CIA constraint, real money balances constrain consumption, and the real interest rate is determined such that the Euler equation is satis…ed. In other words, as long as we assume the binding CIA constraint, there is no feedback from real interest to consumption. In this sense, the mechanism discussed here is somewhat special under the binding CIA constraint. In the next experiment, we will study the case in which the CIA constraint is not binding so that the Euler equation matters for our results. In Section 3.4, we will also see the results for the money demand function with the interest semi-elasticity of money demand to ensure the feedback from the real interest rate to consumption.
Experiment II: The economy in a liquidity trap
The second experiment assesses the money-…nanced …scal stimulus at the time of the liquidity trap. More speci…cally, the money-…nanced …scal stimulus is announced at t = 0 and implemented at t = h 0 as before, but we assume that the government announces the money-…nanced …scal stimulus when the economy is in a recession with I t = 0
To generate the initial state of the liquidity trap, we follow the literature and introduce a deterministic adverse demand shock. 14 Here, the adverse demand shock appears in the log-linearized
Euler equation:
where t = ln (Z t+1 =Z t ). We assume that the economy for t < 1 is in the steady state in which the central bank implements the optimal discretionary monetary policy with the ZLB. Note that the allocation under the discretionary monetary policy is replicated by the Taylor rule i t = t + t , where > 1. As discussed in Galí (2015 Galí ( , 2017 , this is also the case even with the ZLB. Therefore, we express i t as
where the max operator re ‡ects the ZLB. Here I t = 0 (i.e., the situation in which the nominal interest hits the ZLB) implies that i t = ln R, because i t is de…ned as i t ln [(1 + I t ) =R]. At t = 1, t decreases so that the nominal interest rate hits the ZLB. In particular, t < ln R for 1 t T and t = 0 for t > T . The decline in t is unexpected at the beginning of t = 1, but once the decline is observed, the above path of t is fully known. The value of t is assumed to be constant over t 2 [ 1; T ] and is calibrated to generate a three-percent decline in output at the time of the decline in t . 15 Given this decline in output, we examine how the government can help the economy recover from the recession, using the money-…nanced …scal stimulus.
To measure the puri…ed e¤ect of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus, we de…ne the allocation with no policy change as the reference level. 16 In this allocation, the central bank continues to implement the optimal discretionary monetary policy for t 0. Conveniently, this allocation serves as the reference level in measuring the puri…ed e¤ect of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus.
If the ZLB constraint is not binding, the optimal discretionary monetary policy can fully stabilize both output and in ‡ation because of the absence of cost-push shock. If the ZLB is binding, the optimal discretionary monetary policy cannot fully stabilize the output and in ‡ation because of the central bank's failure to lower the nominal interest rate. Note that the assumptions that t < log = log R for 1 t T and that t = 0 for t > T ensure that the ZLB constraint is 1 4 For example, see Jung, Teranishi and Watanabe (2005). 1 5 We calibrate the size of the decline in t at a value smaller than that in Galí (2017) because the output decline amounts to as much as seven percent. As a robustness check, we conduct simulations using the size of the decrease in t set by Galí (2017) . In this case, we obtain results stronger than the results in our benchmark calibration. See the not-for-publication appendix of this paper for more detail. 1 6 In Galí (2017), the allocation with no policy change is denoted as the benchmark case of no …scal response.
binding only for 1 t T under the optimal discretionary monetary policy.
The black dashed line in Figure 3 represents the output response under this allocation with no policy change. In the …gure, we set T = 5 so that the decreased t causes the liquidity trap during 1 t 5. Because of the ZLB on the nominal interest rate, output is lower than the steady state for 1 t 5 and is kept at the steady-state level for t > 5. Note that, in Experiment II, the Euler equation matters for consumption rather than the CIA constraint. This is because the CIA constraint (5) is not binding when the nominal interest rate hits the ZLB. Given that the CIA constraint is not binding, (17) implies that the dynamic path of the real interest rate is important for consumption under I t = 0. In other words,
where r t = i t t+1 . Figure 4 plots the responses of the other macroeconomic variables under the liquidity trap.
Here, the adverse demand shock t (shown in the bottom row of the …gure) is strong enough for the nominal interest rate to hit the ZLB (the third row of the …gure) so in ‡ation drops substantially (the …rst row). The shock to t is common irrespective of the presence of the …scal stimulus. As a result, the real interest rate is high during the …rst few periods (the left panel of the third row of the …gure) in both the money-…nanced …scal stimulus and no policy change scenarios. This high real interest rate reduces consumption in both cases.
To understand the mechanism behind the "recession" in Experiment II, we compare the real interest rate between the cases of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus and no policy change. Comparisons reveal that the real interest rate under the money-…nanced …scal stimulus roughly follows the reference level for t < 4. However, the real interest rate under the money-…nanced …scal stimulus exceeds the reference level substantially at t = 5. In particular, the real interest rate at t = 5 is 2.7 percentage points higher under the …scal stimulus than under its reference level. Since the real interest rate is higher than the reference level for t > 5, consumption at t = 0 is weaker under the money-…nanced …scal stimulus than under the reference level.
Therefore, the intuition is that future government purchases crowd out current consumption through the Euler equation. Likewise, the output is lower than the reference level for 0 < t < h because only changes in consumption re ‡ect changes in aggregate demand in these periods. Higher in ‡ation expectations under the money-…nanced …scal stimulus cause the nominal interest rate to exceed zero one period earlier than the case of no policy change. Consequently, the CIA holds with equality at t = 5 and consumption in the subsequent periods is constrained by the CIA. At t = 5, the reason that consumption is lower under the money-…nanced …scal stimulus than its reference level is the same as in Experiment I. That is, because the aggregate prices are higher than the reference level, consumption becomes lower than the reference level.
We also note that, unlike the case of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus in normal times, the debt-to-GDP ratio is uniformly higher under the money-…nanced …scal stimulus with an implementation lag than under no policy change. Based on (14), a debt-to-GDP ratio higher than its reference level results from a higher real interest than the reference level.
The role of the implementation lag
Because there is no broad consensus on the length of the implementation lag of the money…nanced …scal stimulus, it is useful to consider the output responses for di¤erent values of h. assume that the policy is announced when the economy is initially in the steady state with I t > 0.
In the lower panel, we assume that the policy is announced when the economy is in the liquidity trap with I t = 0. To facilitate comparison between the two cases, the output responses in the lower panel are expressed as output responses relative to the reference level of no policy change.
In both panels of Figure 5 , the recession is more severe for a larger h. In the upper panel of the …gure, each line exhibits a substantial output decline in the period immediately before the implementation of the …scal stimulus. The output decline at one period earlier than the implementation is 0.41 percent for h = 1 and 0.78 percent for h = 8. In the lower panel, the corresponding output decline (relative to the reference level of no policy change) is 0.40 percent for h = 1 and 0.84 percent for h = 8. Furthermore, for h = 8, we observe another large output decline at the time of the announcement of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus, making our results stronger.
When the economy is initially in normal times, (16) holds for 0 t < h. Therefore, the recession becomes more severe as forward-looking …rms have more opportunities to adjust their nominal prices upward prior to the implementation of the …scal stimulus.
When the economy is in the liquidity trap, (19) matters for consumption for 0 t < h.
Therefore, the "recession" relative to the reference level becomes more severe as the extent to which the real interest rate is higher than its reference level becomes greater. This relationship holds as long as I t = 0. Figure 6 assumes that the economy is initially in the liquidity trap as in the lower panel of Figure   5 and numerically compares the extent to which the real interest rate exceeds its reference level.
The …gure shows that, as h increases, the real interest rate is more likely to exceed the reference level of no policy change in response to the announcement of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus.
Each panel presents the dynamics of the real interest rate for h = 0; 1; 4; 8 and its reference level of no policy change. For h = 0 in the upper-left panel, the real interest rate is uniformly lower than the reference level of no policy change. This implies that consumption exceeds its reference level (see (19) ). Next, for h = 1 in the upper-right panel, while the real interest rate is higher than the reference level at t = 0, it is lower than the reference level afterward. Therefore, for h = 1, while consumption falls below the reference level only at t = 0, it again exceeds the reference level afterward. When h = 4, the real interest rate at t = 3 is 3.28 percent, or 2.90 percentage points higher than the reference level. Because of the di¤erences of the real interest rate from the reference level, the forward-looking household reduces its consumption at t = 0. As a result, output at t = 0 declines substantially in comparison with the cases of h = 0 and 1. For the same reason, the output decline for h = 8 is even larger. In fact, the real interest rate at t = 7 is 5.33 percent, or 3.32
percentage points higher than the reference level.
The role of the interest semi-elasticity of money demand
So far, all the …ndings in the preceding subsections rely on the assumption of the CIA constraint.
Because we can interpret that money demand derived from the CIA constraint is a special case of money demand derived from the money-in-the-utility (MIU) function, our results based on the CIA constraint may be somewhat extreme. Therefore, this subsection generalizes money demand as a function of the nominal interest rate and calibrates the model with the estimated interest semi-elasticity of money demand. The key …nding in this subsection is that output responses to the announcement of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus critically depend on the interest semi-elasticity of money demand.
To clarify the motivation of our analysis, let us consider the following log-linearized money demand function (together with the money market equilibrium):
where > 0 denotes the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. Note that as suggested by For simplicity, consider the case when the economy is in the steady state with I t > 0 at the time of the policy announcement. Using (20) , (16) is now changed to
for 0 t < h. This implies that the money-…nanced …scal stimulus does not necessarily cause a recession. In fact, a boom takes place prior to the actual increase in government purchases, if i t > p t for 0 t < h: A su¢ ciently large value of may allow the policymakers to alleviate the recession, even if the money-…nanced …scal stimulus has an implementation lag. A natural question is how large should be for them to successfully prevent the recession. and h = 6 (the blue solid line in the right panel), the e¤ect of i t tends to dominate the e¤ect of p t so that the recession does not take place. We also note that the sensitivity to is much less noticeable for h = 0 than for h = 6, as the left panel of the …gure shows. The output responses are not substantially di¤erent between = 4 and 7, if there is no implementation lag.
In Figure 8 , the economy is assumed to be in the liquidity trap at the time of the announcement. When = 4 and h = 6, the output response follows a path that is slightly below the reference level of no policy change prior to the implementation. When increases to 7, the output response now turns to be above the reference level of no policy change. In other words, the money-…nanced …scal stimulus can be e¤ective even with an implementation lag. Nevertheless, the money-…nanced …scal stimulus with an implementation lag achieves a much slower recovery to the steady state than that without an implementation lag (see the left panel of the same …gure for the case of h = 0).
The responses of the other macroeconomic variables in the same experiment are shown in Figure   9 . The …gure plots responses for = 4 and 7 so it is comparable to Figure 4 . The responses shown in Figure 4 to the announcement of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus can concisely be summarized as follows: The adverse demand shock creates low in ‡ation; The nominal interest rate equals zero until t = 5; The real interest rate is high when the government purchases actually increase; The consumption drops more than the reference level of no policy change, and the debt-to-GDP ratio is higher than the reference level. of the reference level. When = 7, the real interest rate tends to be lower than the reference level.
As a result, consumption exceeds the reference level, prior to the implementation of the money…nanced …scal stimulus. When = 4, however, the real interest rate tends to be higher than the reference level so that consumption falls short of the reference level, prior to the implementation.
The debt-to-GDP ratio is lower than the reference level under both = 4 and 7. However, the lower real interest rate contributes to decreasing the interest payments of the government. Therefore, although the adverse demand shock temporarily increases the debt-to-GDP ratio, the ratio under = 7 even starts to decline around the time of the implementation.
Policy implications
Our …ndings in the previous section suggest various policy implications. For example, our …ndings in Section 3.2 mean that a policymaker can enhance the e¤ect of the …scal stimulus by removing implementation lags. These …ndings, however, would also apply to the standard debt…nanced …scal stimulus. In fact, Cwik and Wieland (2011) report that the …scal stimulus with implementation lag may generate an initial fall in output in the medium-scale and the large-scale New Keynesian models. 19 In this sense, our …ndings are only in line with these previous studies.
Therefore, this section explores the policy implications that are speci…c to the money-…nanced …scal stimulus. To this end, we compare the e¢ cacy of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus with that of the debt-…nanced …scal stimulus. Here, we particularly focus on the sensitivity of the e¤ect of the …scal stimulus on output to the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. The sensitivity of the e¢ cacy to is practically important, because of the well-known instability of money demand. 20 In particular, the literature has long argued that the relationship between real money balances and nominal interest rates is often estimated to be large if the long-run data is used but to be small if the short-run data is used (e.g., Alvarez and Lippi 2014). This instability implies that it would be di¢ cult for policymakers to know precisely the relationship between real money balances and nominal interest rates. Taking the instability of money demand as given, we assess the e¢ cacy of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus. We also investigate whether the presence of the implementation lag increases or decreases the variability of the e¢ cacy. output responses to the money-…nanced …scal stimulus while the lower panels point to those to the standard debt-…nanced …scal stimulus for comparisons. In the lower panels for the debt-…nanced …scal stimulus, the monetary policy follows i t = max ( ln R; t + t ), which is identical to (18) .
Comparisons to the debt-…nanced …scal stimulus
In the simulation, we set at 1:5. In the …gure, we intentionally choose extreme values for = 0 and 10 to evaluate the e¤ect of the …scal stimulus on output under the instability of money demand.
As expected from the discussion in Section 3.4, the upper panels of Figure 10 show that output responses vary across di¤erent under the money-…nanced …scal stimulus. The money-…nanced …scal stimulus is unstable in its e¢ cacy because the instability of money demand transmits to output responses under the money-…nanced …scal stimulus.
By contrast, as shown in the lower panels, output responses under the debt-…nanced …scal stimulus are identical regardless of the value of . This result is not surprising because, once the central bank sets the nominal interest rate by the Taylor rule, money demand and supply become irrelevant to the dynamic paths of key variables such as output and in ‡ation, as in the standard New Keynesian model with the interest rate rule. 21 In our standard parameterization, the debt- 
Unstable e¢ cacy of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus
To assess the e¢ cacy of the …scal stimuli in Figure 10 in more detail, Table 1 For h = 0, the reported output responses can be interpreted as the (impact) …scal multiplier. For h > 0, the reported output responses are not the …scal multiplier because of the di¤erent timing between the output response (at t = 0) and exogenous changes in government purchases (at t = h).
However, the output responses are still comparable to the …scal multiplier in its magnitude.
In the absence of the implementation lag (i.e., h = 0), the output response at t = 0 ranges between 1.42 and 2.93 under the money-…nanced …scal stimulus. The di¤erence in the …scal multipliers arising from changes in is 1.51 in the money-…nanced …scal stimulus. On the other hand, those under the debt-…nanced …scal stimulus is 1.26, and the di¤erence is zero. We thus recon…rm from these numbers the instability of output responses under the money-…nanced …scal stimulus relative to the debt-…nanced …scal stimulus.
The implementation lag strengthens the instability of output responses. In the table, the di¤erence in the "…scal multiplier" for h > 0 ranges from 2.15 to 2.25, much larger than 1.51 for h = 0. If we take a benchmark value of h = 6, the di¤erence is 46 percent larger than that for h = 0 (2.20 vs. 1.51). Moreover, this instability has no monotonicity in h. Even if h = 1, we observe similarly substantial variations of output responses (2.22 vs. 1.51).
We can summarize the policy implications from our analysis as follows. First, policymakers should possess detailed knowledge on the money demand function to implement a successful money-…nanced …scal stimulus. Without the knowledge, the e¢ cacy of the money …nanced …scal stimulus can be uncertain, because of the well-known instability of money demand. We emphasize that this uncertainty in the money-…nanced …scal stimulus is a disadvantage that is not present in the standard debt-…nanced …scal stimulus. If policymakers do not give forward-looking households and …rms many opportunities to make their decisions prior to the implementation of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus, they can prevent the slower recovery of output. Finally, if they face di¢ culties in shortening implementation lags, the money-…nanced …scal stimulus would be a reasonable policy option when the money demand function is stable and the interest semi-elasticity of money demand is likely to be large.
Conclusions
Using the standard New Keynesian model, we analyzed the e¤ect of a money-…nanced …scal stimulus with an implementation lag on output. The introduction of implementation lags that are speci…c to …scal policy may have nonnegligible impacts on the output response to a shock in government purchases. While the money-…nanced …scal stimulus has a strongly positive e¤ect on output in the absence of an implementation lag, such a …scal stimulus may have a weak or even negative e¤ect on output if a reasonably long implementation lag exists. 22 Our analysis also indicated that the e¤ect of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus varies, depending on the interest semi-elasticity of money demand. 23 We argued that the dependence on the interest semi-elasticity of money demand may lead to the instability of the e¢ cacy in the money-…nanced …scal stimulus because the instability of money demand is often observed in the data. An implication for policymakers is that detailed knowledge of the money demand function is important for a better understanding of the e¢ cacy of a money-…nanced …scal stimulus. In this regard, empirical studies on the money demand function that explicitly allows for the ZLB constraint are also important. 24 
A The system of linearized equations
The system of linearized equations is standard except that the CIA constraint does not bind if
The equation for the money growth rate follows (12) . The other equations in the system are the same as Galí (2017) .
Aggregate consumption of the representative household follows the Euler equation:
as we discussed in the main text. In ‡ation evolves as
In the above equation, t is the average price markup given by
Note that the money demand function is given by the CIA constraint:
where l t = m s t p t is the household's real money holdings in equilibrium. This equation holds with equality if I t > 0. We also have the law of motion for real money balances:
If the CIA constraint is not binding (or I t = 0), then (A4) is not used for computing the allocation.
Instead, we use
implying that the household passively holds money based on the money supply.
The equilibrium condition for the …nal goods market is
where g t is exogenously given by (7) . Because government purchases are …nanced by seigniorage, the money supply is automatically determined by
Due to the reaction function for the lump-sum tax rule t = b b t 1 and the above money supply process, the equation for the debt-to-GDP ratio reduces to
where r t is the real interest rate given by the Fisher equation:
The system of equations consists of the endogenous variables, y t , c t , i t , r t ; t , l t , m s t , b t , and t . If 
B The model with the MIU function
To derive money demand that is correlated with the nominal interest rate and is compatible with the ZLB on the nominal interest rate, the literature has assumed an MIU function with a satiation level of liquidity (see Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003) . This is because, if the marginal utility of real money balances is strictly positive, the standard optimality condition rules out the possibility of I t = 0 in equilibrium (given the …nite marginal utility of consumption).
English, Erceg and López-Salido (2017) propose a convenient way of modeling money demand.
Following their approach, we rede…ne the representative instantaneous utility function and re-
Using a quadratic function, we specify the function h( ) as follows:
where k is the satiation level of real money balances and C t is the aggregate consumption. Here C t is taken as given by the representative household and is equal to the household's consumption in equilibrium. Although admittedly ad hoc, this function is convenient for analyzing the model with the ZLB for at least two reasons. First, h (M t =P t ) reduces to a simple quadratic utility function if (M t =P t ) = C t < k is satis…ed for any t. In this case, the marginal utility of real money balances is strictly positive, and thus the nominal interest rate is strictly positive. Second, h (M t =P t ) = 0 and h 0 (M t =P t ) = 0 if the money supply is su¢ ciently large so that (M s t =P t ) = C t = (M t =P t ) = C t k . In this case, the nominal interest can be zero and money becomes a perfect substitute as an asset for transferring wealth into the next period.
Because we replace the CIA constraint by the money demand function based on the MIU function, we change the budget constraint slightly. In particular, we replace P t 1 C t 1 in (1) by
In contrast with (1), the nominal expenditure on the …nal goods is …nanced by the resource received in the same period rather than by the money holdings carried over from the previous period.
Assuming that (M t =P t ) = C t < k , we replace (5) by
where h 0
inverse of the consumption velocity of money. Let k be the steady-state value of k t . We assume that k satis…es k < k . Along with the money market clearing condition and the assumption of = 1, (B3) can be log-linearized as (20) , where
Or equivalently, denoting the consumption velocity of money V c = k 1 , we have
In this speci…cation of the MIU function, the distance of the steady-state consumption velocity of money from the consumption velocity at which real money balances are satiated a¤ects the interest semi-elasticity of money demand.
The other …rst-order conditions and resource constraints remain unchanged in solving the model.
As before, the ZLB needs to be considered with the money market equilibrium condition. In particular, if I t > 0, the household's desired level of money holdings equals the money supply and m s t p t = c t i t holds. If I t = 0 (or equivalently i t = ln R), however, the money holdings may not be equal to their desired level and money is held as a perfect substitute for the oneperiod government bond. In computation, we replace (A4) by l t c t i t , where l t = m s t p t as de…ned in the Appendix A. In solving the model, we use the complementary slackness condition:
(l t c t + i t ) (i t + ln R) = 0, l t c t + i t > 0, and i t + ln R > 0. The interest semi-elasticity of money demand takes either 0 or 10 to allow for a possible instability of money demand.
In the …gure, we assume the liquidity trap with It = 0 as the initial state of the economy. The upper panels show output responses to the announcement of the money-…nanced …scal stimulus while the lower panels correspond to those to the announcement of the debt-…nanced …scal stimulus. In the …gure, the left panels show the cases of h = 0 and the right panels present the cases of h = 6. In the debt-…nanced …scal stimulus, the nominal interest rate is given by it = max (0; t + t) to be consistent with the reference level of no policy change. See the notes to Figures 1  and 3 for additional details. Notes: Numbers in each entry are output response at the time of the announcement of the fiscal stimulus. In the table, the money-and the debt-financed fiscal stimuli are considered, and they are announced when the economy is in the liquidity trap with It = 0 so that the numbers are expressed as the log-deviations of output from its reference level of no policy change. The output responses in each column differ based on the length of an implementation lag h. In the money-financed fiscal stimulus, the interest semi-elasticity of money demand η is calibrated at η = 0 and η = 10, and the difference in output responses between the above two rows are reported for each h. In the debt-financed fiscal stimulus, output responses are identical for any η.
